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ABSTRACT 
 
 With recent and contentious Supreme Court cases dealing with corporate constitutional 
rights, such as Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), as well as with the 
appointment of a new justice, the time is particularly ripe for evaluations of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area, including predictions about the future of this line of cases. The 
purpose of this thesis is to establish a better understanding of the historical jurisprudential 
approach utilized by the Supreme Court to decide corporate constitutional rights by establishing 
the well-known doctrine of selective incorporation as an appropriate analogy. No other works 
attempt to frame the case history of corporate constitutional rights within a consistent doctrine, 
yet many works seek to evaluate and predict Court decisions in this area. This work will 
therefore create a new frame of reference for corporate constitutional rights, providing a new 
basis for interpretation and predictions.  
This thesis begins by conducting a thorough overview of both lines of cases, focusing on 
the establishment of each doctrine over time as well as the reasoning behind the Court’s use of 
this particular approach. Once a clear picture of both approaches has been ascertained, this thesis 
moves on to an overall comparison and evaluation of both approaches. In finding the process, 
intent, and overall effect of both jurisprudential approaches to be the same, the use of selective 
incorporation as an analogy for the Supreme Court’s approach to corporate constitutional rights 
gives way to predictions about the future of corporate constitutional rights. Considering the 
relevant views expressed by the new justice, Neil Gorsuch, and the previous decisions of the 
Roberts Court, this analogy provides solid evidence for predicting continued expansion of 
corporate constitutional rights, including such areas as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, 
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and perhaps even rights of the accused. The comparative approach used in this thesis, as well as 
the analogy it establishes, can also be revisited as new Court decisions are made and as the 
makeup of the Court changes overtime.   
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Arguably one of the most widely discussed and burgeoning issues within the field of 
modern constitutional law is the continued expansion of corporate constitutional rights. With 
several recent, highly contested, and publicly well-known cases in this area, much of the 
discussion has revolved around the arguments for and against the continued growth of 
constitutional rights for corporations. The underlying purpose of this thesis is not take a side in 
this debate, but rather to establish a better understanding of the jurisprudential approach the 
Supreme Court has utilized in deciding these cases. Specifically, the methodology employed in 
this thesis utilizes a comparative analysis to explain the Supreme Court’s jurisprudential 
approach to corporate constitutional rights by comparing that approach with more established 
and better known doctrine of selective incorporation. The unique comparison of these two 
approaches establishes the important similarities between them, and in doing so supports the 
argument that the doctrine of selective incorporation may properly be employed as an analogy 
for the Court’s approach to the evolution of corporate constitutional rights. Using this analogy, 
predictions for the future of corporate constitutional rights under modern Supreme Court 
jurisprudence are made, specifically whether the Court will continue to expand upon the 
constitutional protections afforded to corporations in upcoming years, and if so, which rights and 
protections are most likely to be addressed next.  
Many law review articles and other scholarly works have been written regarding both 
selective incorporation and the constitutional rights of corporations. Selective incorporation is, of 
course, in no way a new or cutting edge topic within the law, and discussions of it can be found 
in numerous articles, books, and judicial opinions. Although the Court’s history with the topic 
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begins as far back as 1833,1 and the use of this doctrine began formally in 1925,2 selective 
incorporation is not a strictly historical or arcane jurisprudential doctrine; the Court utilized this 
process as recently as 2010 to apply the Second Amendment to the states,3 and at the time of this 
writing, there are four provisions of the Bill or Rights that have yet to be incorporated.4 
Corporate personhood (and the rights associated with this personhood), has also become 
a divisive topic, especially following the Supreme Court decisions in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, in which the Supreme Court appeared to 
greatly expand corporate constitutional rights regarding both freedom of speech and freedom of 
religion, respectively. 5 Decided in relatively quick succession, these cases have led to a major 
increase in the interest in this topic, and there have been numerous articles published within the 
last ten years either defending or condemning these decisions. Many of these articles discuss the 
history of corporate personhood and its purpose within the legal field, as well as the intent of the 
original framers of the United States Constitution when debating and drafting the Constitution to 
argue for or against these developments. Regardless of one’s opinion, however, it is clear that the 
Supreme Court of the United States has a long lineage of cases involving the legal personalities 
of corporations under constitutional law. Again, this thesis does not seek to address whether this 
                                                 
1 Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
2 Gitlow v. New York 268 US 652 (1925). 
3 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
4 Ibid. See footnote 13.  
5 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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jurisprudential approach is valid, but rather evaluates the approach itself and utilizes a 
comparative legal analysis to predict the future of this line of case law. Therefore, the primary 
goal of this thesis is to establish a new line of study in corporate constitutional rights, and will 
not seek to weigh in on the issue of its constitutional, historical, or moral validity, nor will the 
author make a judgment as to the positive or negative effect of these decisions on our democratic 
system. Instead, the goal of this thesis will be to objectively evaluate the judicial approach that 
the Supreme Court has historically utilized in deciding what rights apply to corporations (if any), 
arguing that the doctrine of selective incorporation is at least a valid analogy for this process, and 
may even be considered an equivalent approach, just one with a different legal basis. With the 
recent developments in both areas, the time seems right for a fresh evaluation of the Court’s 
approach; a comparison of these two seemingly distinct jurisprudential areas will foster better 
understanding of both.   
To this end, this thesis engages in an in-depth comparison of the approach historically 
utilized by the Supreme Court in deciding constitutional rights of corporations with that of the 
doctrine of selective incorporation. It seeks to prove the similarities between these approaches, 
and in doing so gives a better framework of understanding for Supreme Court jurisprudence 
regarding corporate rights. This comparative analysis is undertaken by comparing those cases 
that are relevant to both selective incorporation as well as corporate rights, pointing out any 
overlap between these two topics in terms of their case history, and then investigating whether 
both lines of jurisprudence represent the same case-by-case, clause-by-clause approach to 
incorporating constitutional rights (either to the states or to corporations). By following the 
timeline of cases for each area, the works seeks to gain a better understanding of the 
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establishment of the doctrine of selective incorporation as well as prove that a consistent 
approach to corporate constitutional rights exists at the Supreme Court level. An evaluation as to 
why this case-by-case approach may have been chosen in each instance is also discussed. 
Finally, the novel mode of analysis employed herein brings not only a better frame of reference 
for the historical process of constitutional rights of corporations and adds to the body of 
knowledge in this area, but also facilitates better predictions for the actions of the Supreme Court 
in this area in the future. This work therefore concludes with several predictions on the future of 
Supreme Court case law in this area based on the analysis of the historical approach and a logical 
continuation of that trend. While predicting future Supreme Court decisions is often difficult and 
highly speculative, understanding the underlying rationale of the Court’s decisions in particular 
thematic areas can provide valuable insight.  
This thesis is organized into three sections. The first section discusses the relevant history 
of, and cases related to, selective incorporation. The second section discuss the relevant history 
and case law regarding alleged corporate constitutional rights. The third section of this thesis 
then turns to an evaluation and comparison of the two doctrines, before the final section lays out 
some predictions using those conclusions. This work achieves some natural symmetry by 
beginning with discussions on the importance of the Fourteenth Amendment for both selective 
incorporation as well as corporate constitutional rights. This is the obvious place to start for both 
topics, as the Fourteenth Amendment is the foundation for selective incorporation, and because 
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the first constitutional amendment explicitly found by the Supreme Court to be applicable to 
corporations was also the Fourteenth Amendment.6   
 To fully understand the historical basis for the evaluation of these two judicial 
approaches, a thorough review of the case history of each needs to be conducted. Each section 
will begin with a brief discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment and The Slaughter-House 
Cases7 because of their importance to both areas of comparison. For selective incorporation, 
other major cases throughout the history of the process are discussed in depth, covering the 
process through to the most recent incorporation case (at the time of this writing), McDonald v. 
Chicago, in 2010.8 Many of the other important incorporation cases in between are also 
examined to establish a better understanding of the approach utilized, specifically the clause-by-
clause breakdown of constitutional rights, and the numerous cases needed to incorporate them 
all. This thesis then addresses those rights that have not been incorporated (either due to lack of a 
case, or because the Supreme Court has specifically found that they do not apply), with an 
emphasis on whether these decisions are still relevant in light of modern jurisprudence and what 
this implies for the doctrine at large. This section concludes with a discussion of the intentional 
choice behind the use of selective incorporation over other approaches (i.e. total incorporation) 
and attempts to shed some light on why the Court made this choice.  
A similar methodology is then followed in the section on corporate constitutional rights, 
with an analysis of several case involving the progressive application of constitutional 
                                                 
6 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 395 (1886). 
7 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
8 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
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protections to corporate entities and the establishment of a consistent approach. Of course special 
attention will also be paid to the more recent and controversial issues of whether freedom of 
speech and freedom of religion are applicable to corporations under Supreme Court case law.9 
Here, too, some attention will be paid to those rights that have been found not to apply to 
corporations, but the discussion will focus more on the arguments that the Court has used against 
applying these rights to corporation, and whether they represent a deviation from the purported 
approach, or simply a different interpretation of its results based on various other factors, such as 
individual justices’ interpretation of corporate personhood. As with selective incorporation, this 
section will conclude with some discussion about the rationale behind the Court’s choice of this 
approach over others. Cases within each section are organized primarily chronologically to allow 
for better historical context and analysis.   
With the recent decisions in Citizens United10 and Hobby Lobby11, many are eager to 
speculate about what is to come for corporate constitutional rights. However, without a proper 
understanding of the history of this topic and the Court’s methodology in deciding these cases, 
such predictions hold little meaning. This work will therefore be unique not only in its 
methodology by comparing these two jurisprudential approaches, but also in its ability to make 
predictions based on this new understanding of the Court’s approach. Of course, as the makeup 
of the Court changes and justices holding different views of corporate legal personality take the 
                                                 
9 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). 
10 Ibid.  
11 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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bench, these predictions may change, because each new justice brings to the Court his or her own 
jurisprudential philosophies. As of the time of this writing, the vacant seat left by Justice Scalia’s 
death makes any predictions particularly difficult, especially when one considers that recent 
corporate rights cases have been decided on a five-to-four basis, mostly along ideological lines. 
The views of the new justice regarding corporate legal personality and corporate constitutional 
rights may completely change the Court’s direction, and these developments will be discussed 
below, and taken into consideration when making predictions later on. 
  8 
SELECTIVE INCORPORATION  
 
History of Incorporation of the Bill of Rights to the States 
 
Selective incorporation is the process by which the Supreme Court of the United States 
has applied various provisions and protections of the Bill of Rights as binding on the states (and 
their political subdivisions). These first ten amendments to the United States Constitution were 
created to ensure individual rights and freedoms against the federal government.12 Not originally 
included in the Constitution, these protections represented a compromise to garner support for 
ratification of the Constitution.13 Although many of the framers considered such a listing of 
rights as unnecessary, these ten amendments were none-the-less adopted within a few years of 
ratification. The question soon became whether these amendments, and the protections they 
afforded, were applicable to state and local governments as well.  
It is interesting to note that Madison, the primary drafter of the Bill of Rights, set forth an 
amendment that would have specifically protected the “right of conscience, freedom of the press, 
or trial by jury in criminal cases” from state infringement.14 The amendment could not garner 
significant congressional support, however, and was therefore never sent to the states for 
consideration.15  
                                                 
12 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (New York: Wolters Kluwer Law and Business, 2013), 379-380. 
13 Lee Epstein and Thomas Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties, and 
Justice, (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2016), 67.   
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid. 
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From their ratification in 1791 through 1833, the Bill of Rights remained inapplicable to 
states, although there was no official ruling on the matter. 16  In the 1833 case Barron v. 
Baltimore, however, the Supreme Court definitively stated that the Bill of Rights did not apply to 
state governments.17 Four decades later, in the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court once again 
rejected attempts to apply the Bill of Rights to the States by rejecting the use of the Privileges 
and Immunities clause (found in Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution) as a basis for 
application.18 Following these decisions, however, judicial opinions on the issue began to 
change, and, starting in 1925, the selective incorporation process formally began with the case 
Gitlow v. New York, in which the Supreme Court ruled for first time that a provision of the Bill 
of Rights (the First Amendment’s freedom of speech guarantee) applied to the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause.19 In Gitlow, the Court held that the “liberty 
guarantee” protected from infringement by the states in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment includes freedom of speech, and failure to protect this freedom constituted an 
infringement on the part of the state of the protection against deprivation of liberty without due 
process of law.20 This same reasoning was used in the following nine decades to apply nearly 
every clause and protection of the Bill of Rights to the states, with a few notable exceptions, 
discussed below.  
                                                 
16 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, 380-381. 
17 Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
18 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, 382-390. 
19 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, 393. 
20 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
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The term selective incorporation is explanatory of the specific approach used, as clauses 
were applied to the states on a case-by-case basis, rather than all at once. Such an approach was, 
and in some ways still is, contested, with disagreements about whether the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause would have been better textual basis for incorporation than the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as well as whether incorporation of First through the Eighth Amendments should 
have occurred all at once (a process known as total incorporation).21 A short discussion of this 
debate is important to fully understand selective incorporation as a judicial approach, and to 
develop an understanding of the potential motives on the part of the Court for choosing this 
particular one. This will also be helpful to the reader in better understanding how this process 
applies to the evolution of the treatment of corporate constitutional rights. 
Beginning with Slaughter-House, the Court’s majority opinions have continuously 
rejected the proposal that the Privileges and Immunities Clause should be applied to state 
citizenship as well as national citizenship. The underlying argument in favor of its use is that if 
this clause was applied to state citizenship, then the logical consequence would be a finding that 
the states, like the federal government, must abide by the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
Although many scholars suggest the Privileges and Immunities Clause would have been the 
more appropriate methodology for incorporating the Bill of Rights to the States (including 
Justice Hugo Black),22 no other majority opinion following the Slaughter-House Cases attempted 
                                                 
21 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, 382-390. 
22 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). See dissenting opinion. See also Kenneth A. Klukowski, Citizen 
Gun Rights: Incorporating the Second Amendment through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 30 N.M.L. 
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to use the clause in this way. Instead, those justices in favor of incorporation utilized a new basis 
to avoid the need to either overturn or distinguish from Slaughter-House. The Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause and the “liberty guarantee” contained therein thus became the 
new textual basis for incorporation. Some debate remains regarding the potential use of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause by the Supreme Court, with some indication in the most recent 
incorporation case that its future use is still possible.23 
Beyond the argument over the textual basis for incorporation of the Bill of Rights to the 
states explored above, there was also some substantial disagreement, even within the Supreme 
Court itself, about the judicial approach to be utilized. In particular, an argument waged over 
whether the Court should continue on a selective, incremental basis, incorporating clauses as 
they came up, case-by-case, or if the Court should sweepingly incorporate the entirety of the first 
eight amendments of the Bill of Rights via “total incorporation.” This argument has become 
largely academic now that the majority of the Bill of Rights has been incorporated, but it still 
                                                 
Rev. 195 (2009), and Brief for Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 33, 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 4099504.  
23 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). See Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, in which he 
argues for the use of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Stating that this clause is both a more 
straightforward path and is more faithful to the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment, Thomas 
maintains that “the right to keep and bear arms is a privilege of American citizenship that applies to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.” Although this stance is not utilized by 
the majority, it is not directly argued against, either.  
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holds important insight into the Court’s approach, and it may still be relevant to the discussion of 
whether “total incorporation” has applicability to corporations.  
Justice Hugo Black was highly in favor of the doctrine of total incorporation of the first 
eight amendments. He stated this view clearly in his concurring opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana, 
writing, “the words ‘No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States' seem to me an eminently reasonable way of 
expressing the idea that henceforth the Bill of Rights shall apply to the States.”24 This approach 
was ultimately rejected in favor of the more incrementalist approach advocated by Justice 
Frankfurter, at least in part due to the rejection of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, upon 
which Justice Black based his argument, as the textual basis for incorporation. Under the Due 
Process clause, rights were incorporated on the basis that they were found to be included in the 
liberty protected under the Fourteenth Amendment from state intervention.25 The Court, under 
this jurisprudential approach, likely felt obligated to argue the merits of each clause of the Bill of 
Rights separately as to whether it should in fact be included in this liberty protection. Although 
ultimately the Supreme Court has found all but a few of the clauses of the Bill of Rights are in 
fact required under the Due Process clause, this approach none the less leaves open the 
possibility of finding that certain clauses are not required and therefore do not apply to the states. 
This would not have been possible under a Privileges and Immunities total incorporation 
strategy. Further exploration of the Court’s reasoning for adopting the selective approach, as well 
                                                 
24 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).  
25 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, 391. 
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as those provisions that the Court has failed to incorporate, are discussed below. But first, a more 
in depth understanding of the case history and the progression of the approach overtime is 
critical.  
 
Timeline of Cases – The Establishment of a Doctrine  
 
As the name suggests, selective incorporation was a gradual process, spanning almost a 
century, during which the Court selected certain protections within the Bill of Rights within the 
confines of cases in front of the Court for decisions and, by arguing that they were critical to 
maintaining due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, made them applicable to 
the states. Although this process is now widely accepted, its history is long and, at times, 
contentious. In this section, this thesis seeks to construct a clear picture of the evolution of this 
doctrine and explain to the reader why the Court turned to this particular approach in lieu of the 
others offered by legal scholars and jurists (and at times, in dissenting or concurring opinions in 
Supreme Court decisions themselves). To better understand this process, a chronological 
overview of relevant cases will be presented, including relevant holdings and dicta.  
 Beginning in 1833 with Barron v. Baltimore, the Supreme Court definitively ruled that 
the Bill of Rights only limited the powers of the Federal government, not the states.26 In Barron, 
the Court specifically rejected the idea that the owner of a business (in this case a wharf) could 
sue the city of Baltimore for compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.27 
                                                 
26 Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
27 Ibid. 
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Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Marshall asserted that if the framers of the Constitution 
had intended the rights and protections of the Bill of Rights to apply to the states, they would 
have indicated this in their language.28 Stated plainly, the first ten "amendments contain no 
expression indicating an intention to apply them to the State governments. This Court cannot so 
apply them."29 Furthermore, Marshall reasoned that state constitutions existed specifically to fill 
this gap and to limit state power or ensure individual rights were protected against state 
encroachment.30 This logic was apparently so obvious to the justices at the time that the 
unanimous decision was handed down before the city even presented its arguments.31 Whether 
this was a firm stance favoring state’s rights, or merely a reading of the Bill of Rights as nothing 
more than a concessionary measure on the part of the federalists to get the constitution ratified is 
interesting but not relevant to this thesis.  
This interpretation remained unquestioned for nearly four decades, until the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which was passed in large part over concerns about the treatment of 
freed slaves in the former confederate states.32 Its phrasing, explicitly directed at limiting state 
actions, brought a new opportunity to argue for constitutional protections against state 
governments. Eventually, in the Twentieth Century, the Fourteenth Amendment became the 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Lee Epstein and Thomas Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties, and 
Justice, (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2016), 67.   
32 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, 383-390. 
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foundation for the doctrine of selective incorporation and, I will argue later, also formed the 
basis for the Court’s gradual and ongoing process of applying the Bill of Rights to corporations.  
  The Slaughter-House Cases (1872) was the first opportunity for the Court to interpret 
this new amendment.33 This case is extremely important in understanding why the Court may 
have chosen to utilize the Due Process Clause and the selective approach rather than the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the total incorporation approach, as described above. In 
Slaughter-House, the Court once again refused to find the Bill of Rights to be applicable to the 
states, this time rejecting the argument that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment should be read as effectively incorporating all protections of the Bill of 
Rights.34 This is important because although a few justices and legal scholars continued to argue 
in favor of a wider interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause that would have 
incorporated the entirety of the first eight amendments, no other majority opinion has attempted 
to utilize this clause in this way; to do so, the Court would have been forced to overturn 
Slaughter-House. Whether the commitment to this interpretation is attributable solely to 
deference to stare decisis or can be traced to other concerns will be addressed later.   
Interestingly, this case can also be seen as an early rejection of corporate constitutional 
rights, as the suit was brought by businesses (although not corporations, per se) seeking redress. 
The Court’s narrow interpretation of the Amendment, focusing solely on its purpose to prevent 
laws which discriminated against newly freed slaves, seemed an early blow to the possibility of 
                                                 
33 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
34 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
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expanding its protections to apply to other entities as well to the states. This will be more fully 
explored in the section on corporate constitutional rights.  
The next major incorporation case to come before the Court was Hurtado v. California 
(1884).35 In this case, a criminal defendant attempted to argue that the state of California 
infringed upon his right to indictment by a grand jury.36 Importantly, the argument Hurtado set 
forth centered on whether this qualified as an infringement of his due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, rather than arguing that the Fifth Amendment protections should be 
directly applicable to the states, as had been argued in Barron. The Court interpreted the question 
before them as whether the right to a grand jury indictment was “essential to that ‘due process of 
law’,” a similar test to the one later Supreme Courts used over time in determining what 
provisions should be incorporated.37 Although the Court ruled against Hurtado, failing to find the 
grand jury indictment to be essential to due process, the Court did not reject the idea that some 
protection in the Bill of Rights could be considered essential to due process.38 This left open the 
possibility of finding other protections to be applicable to the states via the due process guarantee 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Total incorporation, however, was once again rejected. Justice 
Matthews made a very strong argument; because the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause is 
just one part of the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause of neither the Fifth Amendment nor 
                                                 
35 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, (1884). 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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the Fourteenth Amendment could be considered the equivalent of the entire Bill of Rights.39 This 
argument relies on the assumption that it would not have been included if it was merely a 
redundancy. The Court had clearly laid out that any attempt at incorporating rights using the Due 
Process clause would therefore need to be a selective, incremental one. 
Following Hurtado, however, the Court remained unclear on its stance regarding 
incorporation. In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. Chicago (1897), e. 40  
This case is also of interest because the entity requesting relief is a company, not an individual. 
This apparently caused no contention within the Court, as this is not specifically addressed in the 
decision. Further discussion of this case within the timeline and perspective of corporate 
constitutional rights will take place in the following section.  
But while Chicago Railroad may have seemed to signal that the Court was prepared to 
begin incorporating other rights, it did not address the apparent contradiction with its own 
argument and that of Hurtado. What distinction had the Court made between the right to a grand 
jury indictment and the guarantee of just compensation that warranted incorporating one but not 
the other? The next important case in this timeline, Maxwell v. Dow (1900) failed to give any 
further clarity. Here, the Court again refused to incorporate the right to a grand jury indictment, 
in addition to the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, offering little explanation for this 
apparent reversal from Chicago Railroad and essentially ignoring the incorporation argument 
entirely.41  
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
41 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).  
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It was not until Twining v. New Jersey (1908) that a clear doctrine was formed. Although 
the Court failed to incorporate the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, Justice 
Moody finally articulated a clear approach for determining whether a protection should be 
incorporated or not. According to him, the question the Court should ask itself is whether a right 
“is … a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of a free 
government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of a such a government.”42 If so, then that 
right or protection should be considered part of the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Importantly, Moody also provided a solid argument for the specific use of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and a case-by-case approach, rather than total 
incorporation. Regarding the notion of incorporation via the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
(which would have supported total incorporation), the majority opinion cites the Slaughter- 
House Cases as evidence against this interpretation.43 Regarding the Due Process Clause, 
however, Moody wrote,  
It is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight 
Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state 
action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law. If this is 
so, it is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, 
but because they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of 
due process of law.44 [Emphasis added] 
 
In clarifying this point that a right should be applied to the states not simply because it is 
mentioned in the Bill of Rights but rather because without it the concept of due process 
                                                 
42 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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would be meaningless, yet another nail was placed in the coffin of total incorporation. It 
also helped to resolve the apparent conflict in earlier decisions that had applied certain 
protections but not others; some were apparently implicit in or fundamental to the 
concept of due process, and some were not.  
 With this new doctrine came other questions, however. If all rights and 
protections in the Bill of Rights were not implicit in due process, how was the Court to 
determine which were? While Justice Moody in Twining declined on precedent to attempt 
to define due process, he did suggest some “settled” conclusions as to the matter. 
According to him, a process of law might be considered fundamental to due process if it 
has settled usage both in the United States and in England prior to our independence, but 
this was not sufficient cause to find a right to be essential to due process.45 This implies 
certain a reliance on historical precedence. Yet, Moody also suggested that these 
“fundamental principles” should “be ascertained from time to time by judicial action,” 
implying an understanding that opinions may change over time.46  
The history of the Court’s interpretation of the right against self-incrimination, 
rejected by Moody in Twining, is a good example of this transformation over time. In 
Adamson v. California (1947), the issue was again brought before the Court. The decision 
in Twining was reaffirmed, although by that time the doctrine of selective incorporation 
had been well established and many other rights had already been incorporated.47 The 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
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issue arose again less than twenty years later in Malloy v. Hogan (1964). This time, the 
Court did find this protection to be fundamental to due process rights and applied it to the 
states.48 Opinions (of the justices, at least) had apparently changed in relatively little time. 
Ultimately, this selective, due process based approach became sufficiently accepted, and 
sufficiently broad, to encompass almost every provision of the Bill or Rights. Justice 
Moody may have intended the doctrine to allow for certain (or even the majority of) 
provisions to remain unincorporated, but it has not been used in this way.   
 It was not until Gitlow v. New York (1925), however, that the Court finally used 
Justice Moody’s due process test to incorporate a clause of the Bill of Rights. A relatively 
short part of a case otherwise concerned with what qualifies as protected speech, Justice 
Sanford, writing for the majority, simply stated, “we may and do assume that freedom of 
speech and of the press which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by 
Congress are among the fundamental personal rights and "liberties" protected by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”49 Just like 
that, the Court explicitly found that the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech 
and press was applicable to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
In retrospect, the First Amendment seems a reasonable first choice. If, after all, 
the doctrine the Court had adopted stated that only those provisions of the Bill of Rights 
                                                 
48 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
49 Gitlow v. New York 268 US 652 (1925). 
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which are necessary to ensure due process will be incorporated, starting with those rights 
which are the least contested is a good way to lay a foundation, which could be built upon 
later in more controversial cases. Most state constitutions already included some 
language alluding to freedom speech, and most of the American public feels strongly 
about the importance of this right for our democracy. The Court’s choice, therefore, 
ensured a greater likelihood of a favorable decision in this particular case, as well as a 
lesser likelihood of future Courts seeking to overturn it. Following this line of reasoning, 
it is not surprising that many of the subsequent provisions incorporated throughout the 
next few decades were also rights relating to freedom of expression, and often decided 
with equally little argument.50   
With some exceptions, the process of selective incorporation rolled forward 
smoothly after Gitlow, gradually applying more and more provisions, still on a case-by-
case, at times line-by-line, basis. The 1960s and the Warren Court saw another large 
wave of incorporation cases, this time regarding more controversial issues – the rights of 
the accused. Issues such as the right to publicly provided counsel51 and the Miranda 
warning52 famously arose from these decisions. These rights were often more contentious 
because their incorporation would require many states to make fundamental and 
                                                 
50 Fiske v. Kansas,  274 U.S. 380 (1927) (freedom of speech), Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (free 
press), Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (religious freedom), DeJonge. 
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly and right to petition). 
51 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
52 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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comprehensive changes to their criminal justice systems. Nevertheless, with a more solid 
foundation for the doctrine now laid, the Court revisited several provisions of the Bill of 
Rights that they had previously ruled were not necessary to due process and therefore 
should not be applied to states. In Malloy v. Hogan (1964), for example, the Court 
overturned the decision in Twining, ruling that the Fifth Amendment protection against 
self-incrimination is inherent to the concept of due process and therefore is binding upon 
the states.53 Palko v. Connecticut (1937), a decision made after Gitlow had clearly 
established the doctrine, was also overturned by the Warren Court in Benton v. Maryland 
(1969), which incorporated the right against double jeopardy.54  The Court continued 
incorporating various provisions of the Bill of Rights all the way up to the most recent 
case of McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010), which incorporated the Second Amendment 
right to bear arms.55  
It is interesting to note, of course, that while total incorporation was rejected as a 
judicial strategy, selective incorporation has nonetheless applied all but a few provisions 
of the Bill of Rights to the states. If the initial goal of selective incorporation as a judicial 
approach was to leave open the possibility of finding some provisions not to be binding 
on the states, this strategy has been essentially abandoned. Before turning to a more 
complete discussion of the (evolving) rationale behind the use of selective incorporation, 
                                                 
53 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
54 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
55 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
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it is worthwhile to identify the specific protections of the Bill of Rights that have not yet 
been incorporated and seek to explain why it is the Court has not done so.  
 
Unincorporated Provisions of the Bill of Rights 
 
 Although the process took decades, there are only four provisions of the Bill of Rights 
that are not currently incorporated. Justice Alito, writing for the majority in the most recent 
incorporation case, McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010), took the opportunity to specifically 
address those provisions remaining to be incorporated. Here, he lists the Third Amendment 
protection against quartering of soldiers, the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of grand jury 
indictment, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases, and the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines as the only rights that remain to be 
incorporated. 56 I will address each of these individually. 
 First, the Third Amendment protection against quartering of troops has never been 
brought before the Supreme Court for any such decision to be made. This is probably because no 
related issue has arisen in modern history for the Courts to adjudicate. Therefore, the Court has 
not so much failed to incorporate this provision as the issue has failed to appear before the Court 
for decision.57 The Eighth Amendment protection against excessive fines has also has never 
                                                 
56 Ibid. See footnote 13.  
57 It is relevant to note that although a case has never reached Supreme Court, there have been several federal 
court cases dealing with the issue. For example, in Engblom v. Carey (2d Cir. 1982), the circuit court found 
that national guardsmen qualify as soldiers, and ruled that the Third Amendment is applicable to the states. 
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technically been ruled on by the Court, although a case was once presented. In Browning-Ferris 
Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., (1989), the issue was raised, but the Court declined 
to decide whether the protection applied to states.58 It cannot be said for sure that either of these 
provisions would be incorporated if presented before the Court, but there is sufficient precedent 
to suggest that they would be.  
 As for the Fifth Amendment grand jury requirement and the Seventh Amendment right to 
jury trial in civil cases, the Court has explicitly found that neither are inherent in due process and 
therefore are not applicable to the states. Hurtado, discussed above, remains controlling on the 
issue of grand jury requirements, although this case is now over 130 years old.59 Two Supreme 
Court cases have held that the right to a jury trial in civil cases is not applicable to the states, but 
the most recent is from 1916, still over a hundred years old at this point.60 As Justice Alito 
pointed out, this precedent is not just old, they “long predate the era of selective incorporation.”61 
This observation, although written only in a footnote, indicates that there is reason to reconsider 
these decisions in light of modern understandings of the Bill of Rights and state responsibilities. 
While it cannot be said for sure, this may indicate a desire on the part of the Court to retry these 
                                                 
More recently, in Mitchell v. City of Henderson, Nevada a district court found dismissed a case alleging state 
violation of the Third Amendment by ruling that police do not qualify as soldiers. 
58 Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) 
59 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, (1884). 
60 Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 (1877). 
61 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). See footnote 13.  
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issues for the opportunity to overturn these decisions in favor of ones more consistent with the 
rest of the Court’s jurisprudence in this area.  
 
Court Reasoning and Intent 
 
 The question we turn to now is why the Court chose the selective incorporation approach 
over a more sweeping total incorporation strategy. In hindsight, it can appear as though the 
selective approach was the obvious best choice, or the only real choice, but as discussed 
previously, there were those in the legal community, including sitting justices, who disagreed 
that this was the correct method. Consider that, even once the Court decided on the use of a 
selective approach, it could have chosen to incorporate whole amendments at a time, rather than 
a clause-by-clause approach. For example, once the Court found that freedom of speech should 
be applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, could they not have also held all other 
freedom of expression protections, so obviously interrelated, to apply as well? Why did they 
choose to make such narrow rulings? Considering how few provisions remain unincorporated 
today, it seems strange that the Court would spend the time adjudicating these issues on a case-
by-case basis rather than finding all provisions of the Bill of Rights, by their very nature, could 
not rightly be abridged by state governments any more than by the federal government.  
First, it is important to evaluate the impact The Slaughter-House Cases had on 
subsequent Court decisions. Was selective incorporation chosen solely out of a desire not to 
overturn Slaughter-House? This seems unlikely for several reasons. For one, although the case 
has never been directly overturned, its central argument regarding the purpose and appropriate 
use of the Fourteenth Amendment (as applicable only to freed slaves and their decedents) has 
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long been abandoned. This interpretation was controversial even at the time, considering the 
Congressman responsible for the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly stated, on the 
record, that his intention was to make the protections of the Bill of Rights applicable to the 
states.62 Furthermore, the Courts tendency to defer to precedent was not so strong as to prevent 
them from overturning many more cases throughout the decades of selective incorporation. 
While this may be a reflection of the change in the makeup of the Court, or a shift in general 
judicial ideologies overtime, commitment to stare decisis is nevertheless not a sufficient 
explanation for the adoption of selective incorporation as the Court’s official doctrine.  
Discussions of judicial activism versus restraint (the personal views of justices as to what 
the role of the Court is within the larger system) could also come into play. This reasoning 
focuses on the tendency of individual justices to favor total versus selective incorporation based 
on whether they think the Court has the right to make those sorts of sweeping decisions when a 
case can be decided on narrower grounds. Of course this is pertinent, and can be used to explain 
some of the underlying debate about selective versus total incorporation. Still, the Court had (and 
took) many opportunities to argue against total incorporation. Many different arguments were 
posited over time, including the proper (narrow) reading of the Privileges and Immunities clause 
as well as the nature of the Bill of Rights in regard to the Due Process clause (that the two were 
not synonymous). No justice, however, ever put forth an argument referring to a particular 
judicial philosophy, either activism or restraint, as reasoning for or against total incorporation. 
                                                 
62 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). Citing Congressman Bingham and others in the legislative 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
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As this argument is not infrequently used by the Court in other cases to avoid broad rulings, its 
absence here can be taken as an indication that even if it was a consideration, it was not of major 
concern to a majority of justices.  
There is also, of course, the issue of the Supreme Court’s own boundaries, which limit it 
to deciding only cases and controversies. Although not explicitly used as an argument against 
total incorporation, it is possible the Court considered it improper to decide any more than the 
issue at hand in any case. Keeping decisions narrowly tailored to the issue at hand may also 
account for why the Court did not decide to incorporate whole amendments at a time, for 
example incorporating freedom of religion at the same time as freedom of speech. Instead the 
justices may have felt it prudent to err on the side of caution and avoid sweeping decisions.  
Another explanation for this judicial strategy is that the case-by-case nature of selective 
incorporation was necessary to allow for new opinions to be formed and for the doctrine to 
slowly gain traction; essentially that the selective, due process approach offered the best chance 
of success. To understand this argument, it is important to place early incorporation cases into 
context. For much of our history it was widely accepted that the Constitution was primarily a 
document for limiting the federal government; state governments were to be constrained by state 
constitutions, and people seeking redress against state encroachments should turn to state 
specific institutions. The problem of protecting freed slaves forced the country to face a 
deprivation of rights by the states on a massive scale. With the Fourteenth Amendment came a 
new understanding of the role of the Constitution regarding state power within the context of a 
new realization as to why such a change was necessary.  
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Still, many people, including Supreme Court justices, may have been hesitant to turn 
away from decades of deference to the states regarding these issues. Others may have been 
concerned about the logistics of implementing all of these provisions at once, especially 
considering the myriad of problems facing the country in the reconstruction era. Total 
incorporation at the point of Slaughterhouse may have proven to be an enforcement 
impossibility. As time went on, the importance of protecting citizens against the states gained 
traction, and by the early 1900s the Court began to signal it was willing to consider incorporating 
rights. The reliance on the Due Process clause at this point may have been in part because parties 
stopped attempting to use the Privileges and Immunities Clause after Slaughterhouse, but it is 
more likely that a majority of the justices actually preferred the incremental approach the Due 
Process cause offered.  
As shown by many of the early incorporation cases (which signaled a willingness to 
adopt an incorporation doctrine but continued to reject the particular provisions brought before 
them) many justices at the time were still committed to maintaining the Bill of Rights as 
primarily federally focused; they did not think it necessary, or prudent, to require that all states 
meet the same standards as the federal government, particularly in the area of criminal justice. 
More importantly, though, even to those justices in favor of the opinion that the entirety of the 
Bill of Rights should be applicable to the states, selective incorporation probably seemed like a 
more successful strategy precisely because of its incremental nature.  
Beginning, as the Court did, with less controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights (those 
that many state constitutions already protected, for example, and which therefore would have the 
least resistance) ensured favorable outcomes unlikely to be overturned. It is important to 
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remember that justices must concern themselves with the ideological makeup of future Courts; 
overturning a case, although uncommon, is always possible if the Court (and the public) feels 
strongly enough. Even if a majority of the justices at the time agreed on a total incorporation 
approach, or even a more sweeping selective approach, there was sufficient historical precedence 
on the issue to consider a reversal of opinions plausible. Importantly, the more sweeping the 
decision, the less cases would need to be overturned, the less relevant precedent to argue against, 
and the more likely there would be valid arguments against incorporating certain provisions. This 
selective approach therefore also ensured a series of opinions could be written, establishing the 
doctrine and affirming the precedent, making a future reversal far less likely. This concern for 
negative reactions is not exclusive to other justices, however - the Court likely wanted to 
maintain positive public opinion and avoid getting “too far ahead” of the American public, which 
could indirectly lead to a reversal of a case via congressional action.  
Once the doctrine was well established, and a Court friendly to the idea arose, more 
‘controversial’ provisions, such as protections of criminal defendants, could be incorporated. 
With much more precedent to rely on, and a country more accustomed to the idea of the 
Constitution being appropriately utilized to limit state power, these decisions found much firmer 
ground than they did a few decades earlier. Keeping in mind many of the Warren Court’s 
selective incorporation decisions were decided on relatively narrow margins, even after decades 
of precedent in favor of the doctrine of incorporation as a whole, concerns about certain 
provisions being “less popular” as incorporation candidates were well founded.  
Although it is difficult to know the intentions and logic of every justice’s decision 
regarding these cases, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the adoption of the selective 
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incorporation doctrine, utilizing the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, was 
neither an accident nor merely an instance of deference to earlier rulings. Lack of evidence 
supporting judicial restraint as the primary goal also leads us to seek a better explanation. It is 
reasonable to suggest that those justices in favor of incorporation made thoughtful choices in 
their defining and utilization of the doctrine of selective incorporation. Specifically, they likely 
realized that a strong foundation of relatively uncontroversial cases was the best way to ensure a 
smooth and successful process of incorporation; this particular judicial approach was the best 
way to achieve that goal. As we turn to the approach being utilized by the Court to grant 
constitutional rights to corporations, the reasoning behind the adoption of the selective 
incorporation doctrine, as well as its technical consequences, are important to keep in mind.
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CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
 
History of Corporate Theory and Corporate Constitutional Rights 
 
This section will briefly address the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding 
corporate constitutional rights, including a brief discussion of important cases, an explanation of 
the evolution of corporate personality, and an account of corporate “pass through” theory and 
how it relates to the cases at hand. Before moving on, it is important to note that, for the purposes 
of this thesis, the distinction between corporations and other forms of businesses is largely 
inconsequential, as for the most part corporate structure is not significant in Court rulings (recent 
cases, particularly Hobby Lobby,63 are exceptions). As such, the term “corporation” will here be 
used to refer to any type of collective business entity, unless the particular structure of the 
business is relevant to the decision at hand.   
Much like selective incorporation, the issue of applying constitutional provisions to 
corporations began early in U.S. Supreme Court history. As early as 1819, the Court began 
finding rights and protections of the Constitution to be applicable to private corporate entities.64 
As with selective incorporation, the Slaughter-House Cases represented an important 
impediment to the extension of rights. Its narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
applicable only to recently released slaves and their decedents excluded the businesses seeking 
                                                 
63 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). 
64 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 US 518 (1819). Found the New Hampshire legislature had 
unconstitutionally infringed on the private college’s rights under the Contract Clause.  
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relief, representing a blow to the potential use of the amendment to ensure further protections for 
corporate entities.65  
It did not take long for the Court to reverse their decision in Slaughter-House, however, 
and find that the both the Due Process clause and the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, are applicable to corporations. The 1886 case, Santa Clara County v. Southern 
Pacific Railroad Company, is generally agreed to be the first Supreme Court case to apply 
provisions of the Bill or Rights specifically to a corporation.66 Although this is not clearly stated 
in the opinion itself, this case has been repeatedly cited as evidence that the Supreme Court has 
already settled whether the corporations are considered “persons” for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. 67 Although this certainly left room for 
confusion, Covington & L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, decided in 1896, explicitly found that 
corporations have due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
cited Santa Clara as precedence.68  
Aside from Slaughter-House, further overlap exists between cases of selective 
incorporation and corporate constitutional rights, as several cases within the selective 
incorporation case history actually involve corporations, not individuals, seeking relief. Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. Chicago (1897), for example, was the first case to 
                                                 
65 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
66 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 395 (1886).  
67 Ibid. See official Court Syllabus in the United States Reports.  
68 Covington & L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578 (1896). 
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find a provision of the Bill of Rights to be applicable to the states.69 Because the appellant in this 
case was also a corporation, the Court did not just find the Takings Clause to be applicable to the 
states; it also inherently found it to be applicable to entities other than individuals 
(corporations).70 In some cases, as with Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., the issue of a corporate 
appellant or appellee rather than an individual was not cause for significant argument. In later 
cases, as with Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,71 the status of a corporation, as this relates to the ability 
to claim constitutional protection, became much more contentious.  
Like selective incorporation, further constitutional provisions continue to be applied to 
corporations on a case-by-case, clause-by-clause basis. The argument of this thesis is that the 
current jurisprudential approach being employed by the Supreme Court of the United States to 
apply constitutional rights to corporations is fundamentally the same process as that historically 
utilized by the Court to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states (the doctrine known as 
selective incorporation). To that end, this section will focus on the important aspects of the 
corporate constitutional jurisprudential approach, with brief mentions of selective incorporation, 
while the following section will provide a more in depth comparison of the two.  
The evolution of corporate personhood, the legal understanding of the status of 
corporations and their rights under the law, is long, complex, and somewhat meandering in its 
evolution. A general understanding of these evolving opinions is important for a proper 
                                                 
69 Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
70 Ibid. 
71 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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understanding of the Court’s approach to corporate constitutional rights, and I will therefore 
begin here before moving onto an evaluation of the case history.  
Legal scholar Yvette Ann Walker places the history of corporate personhood into three 
distinct theories, each representing a different stage of the legal status of corporations.72 These 
stages evolve over time, but are not strictly linear, in that contemporary opinions at any given 
time may be a mix of the three. The first theory is known as the “concessionary theory,” which 
imagines corporations as strictly “legal fictions” with only those rights given to them by the state 
(in their charter).73 However, as statutes began to emerge that allowed corporations to form 
without a formal charter from the state legislature, and the relationship between the state and 
corporations began to decline, the process of incorporating a business became more of an 
individual venture.74 With this change came a new conception of what the legal importance of a 
corporation was, the “real entity theory,” which suggests that corporations are more than a legal 
fiction and hold significance outside of the strict parameters of legal documents. This theory 
began the establishment of a distinct personality for corporations and provides a legitimate basis 
for the sanctioning of this personality via special rights. At this same time, however, many 
scholars also began to argue the opposite view point, asserting that corporate personhood 
                                                 
72 Yvette Ann Walker, More Than Human: Modern Expansion of Corporate Personhood Rights In Hobby 
Lobby, 24 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Social Justice 297 (2015).  
73 Ibid.  
74 Ibid.  
  35 
language was “not a signal that firms had an independent presence.” 75 This argument continues, 
at least in essence, today.  
The final stage of this evolution towards corporate personhood, according to Walker, 
came as corporations began unprecedented growth in both size and scope. This expansion lead to 
the “natural entity theory,” which suggests that corporations exercise an independent existence 
from both the state and the individuals who make it up, acting as separate entities in and of 
themselves.76 The United States Congressional Dictionary Act of 1948 supports this 
interpretation that corporate personhood is separate and equivalent (at least in most ways) to 
natural personhood. In it, Congress states that in "any Act of Congress, unless the context 
indicates otherwise ... the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations."77 Though not 
directly dealt with in this thesis, the evolution of corporate criminal responsibility also coincides 
with the progression of corporate personality, as courts began finding criminal liability for 
corporations themselves and not merely for the agents thereof.78 This criminal liability for 
corporations has been found to include crimes beyond merely financial ones, including negligent 
and reckless homicide.79 This too represents the changing view of the Courts as to the status of 
corporations and corporate personhood. As for modern corporate theory, Walker argues it is 
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essentially of a mix of original “real entity” and “natural entity” theory. This modern corporate 
theory admits that corporations are artificial creations, but also asserts that they are “real and 
independent actor[s] with goals and actions separate from the individuals composing [them].”80 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of whether a corporation should be granted certain 
constitutional rights depends largely on what type of corporate personhood theory to which they 
subscribe to, so it is important to keep these theories in mind while discussing specific cases and 
the arguments set forth by individual justices.  
Finally, before moving on, it is crucial to discuss the concept of corporate pass through 
theory. Although never explicitly used by the Supreme Court as an argument in favor of 
corporate constitutional rights, it has been used by federal circuit Courts to find more “personal” 
provisions of the Bill or Rights (e.g. freedom of speech) to apply to corporations.81 As the name 
suggests, this theory rests on the foundation that certain rights should be granted to corporations 
because the rights of the individual(s) who own it “pass through” to the corporation itself.82 
Failure to articulate the use of this theory on the part of the Supreme Court, does not, however, 
suggest its logic is not still in use. The extent to which decisions of the Court nonetheless reflect 
this rationale will be discussed below. 
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Timeline of Cases – The Establishment of a Doctrine 
 
 Much like selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights, corporate constitutional rights has 
a long and meandering case history, with some significant overlap between the two. As discussed 
above, several early cases hold importance for both lines of decisions, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment also plays an important role in the jurisprudence of both. This section will seek to 
establish the major cases within the history of the Court’s corporate constitutional rights 
jurisprudence, with particular focus on determining whether a consistent judicial approach can be 
garnered, and if so what that approach is founded on. In doing so, a chronological review of 
important cases will be presented, including relevant holdings and dicta, with emphasis on those 
cases which have relevance to selective incorporation as well. 
 It is no coincidence or forced attempt at symmetry that leads us to begin, as we did in the 
section on selective incorporation, with a discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment. As 
mentioned in the section on selective incorporation, the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment 
represented a dramatic change in the understanding of the role of the Bill of Rights; there was 
now firm constitutional grounds for finding that the Bill of Rights had further reach than just the 
federal government. Although much of this expansion of rights is thought of in terms of 
protecting individuals from the states, this broadened reading of its precepts (post-Slaughter-
House) was an important step in applying the Bill of Rights to other entities besides individuals, 
namely corporations, as well.  
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 Ultimately, the Court had little difficulty in finding the protections of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to be applicable to corporations.83 Indeed, there seemed to be far less contention 
over corporate rights in this area than in regard to individual rights being protected from the 
states. Although originally the assertion that the Fourteenth Amendment was applicable to 
corporations appeared only in a headnote issued by the Court Reporter, Chief Justice Waite was 
quoted (before arguments were made) as saying, “[t]he Court does not wish to hear arguments on 
the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which 
forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, 
applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.”84 Comparing the long series of 
cases needed for the Court to reach agreement about whether selective incorporation via the Due 
Process clause was valid, and how it would be handled, to the almost perfunctory treatment of 
corporate constitutional protections yields a somewhat confusing conclusion. After all, it may be 
difficult to believe in the contemporary context, considering how well settled selective 
incorporation is as a doctrine, and how controversial corporate constitutional rights have become, 
that, at least at first, corporate constitutional rights had more judicial support than incorporation 
of the Bill of Rights to the states. However, once a solid groundwork had been laid, selective 
incorporation cases proceeded on course without significant problems. As this section will 
demonstrate, corporate constitutional rights has not proceeded as quickly or comprehensively as 
selective incorporation has over the same time span. 
                                                 
83 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 395 (1886). 
84 Ibid. 
  39 
 Although the lack of dicta relating to this holding makes it difficult to establish a clear 
picture of the Court’s approach in these cases, it is reasonable to assume that the Court 
considered the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure equal protection and due process 
irrefutably included corporations. Whether this interpretation was based on a reading of 
corporations merely as groupings of individuals who retain their rights or whether the Court 
considered corporations to be separate entities endowed in and of themselves with equal 
protection is unclear, however.   
It is also interesting to note how the confusion surrounding Santa Clara and Covington & 
Lexington Tpk. Road Co. regarding the Court’s lack of formal dicta and the subsequent 
assumptions has contributed to the problem of establishing a consistent judicial approach for 
corporate constitutional rights. While selective incorporation’s troubled beginnings led to a series 
of decisions laying out the specific approach to be utilized, including arguments in favor of that 
particular approach and against alternatives, corporate constitutional rights relatively easy 
beginnings leaves a bit of a gap in judicial reasoning. This is one reason why the comparison of 
the two judicial approaches is so important. 
 After the Fourteenth Amendment issue was settled, the Court turned to other 
constitutional provisions, specifically those in the Bill of Rights. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City 
of Chicago, the first case of incorporation of a provision of the Bill of Rights to the states, is 
important here because in reaching this decision, the Court also found that corporations could 
find protection under the Takings clause. 85 With Santa Clara and Covington & Lexington Tpk. 
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Road Co. having firmly established the applicability of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to corporations, 86 the Court apparently felt no need to 
address the corporate status of the appellant in its decision other than to state that the owners of a 
property (whether a corporation or an individual) was inconsequential for purposes of the case.87 
Here, the nature of the provision in question was less controversial in regard to corporate 
claimants. For one, property owned by a business is still owned by individuals on some level. 
Two, property is essential to the functioning of most businesses, and therefore the protection is 
highly correlated to maintaining the individual interests of those involved with the business.  
 Following Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., the next major decision in the realm of corporate 
constitutional law was Hale v. Henkel, in which the Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
protection against unreasonable search and seizure was applicable to corporations, but that the 
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination was not.88 Just as seemingly 
contradictory decisions within early selective incorporation cases raised questions about what 
provisions were applicable to states and how the Court would make such determinations, this 
case presented a question of why some constitutional rights should be afforded to corporations 
and not others, and how the Court would go about making such distinctions. According to Justice 
Brown, who delivered the opinion of the Court, the protection against self-incrimination “is 
purely a personal privilege of the witness” and therefore could not be invoked by an individual 
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acting as an agent for another person or entity (in this case a corporation).89 The idea of certain 
rights being “purely personal” has been utilized and expanded upon in subsequent cases, and will 
be touched on later. In this case, though, Justice Brown emphasized the nature of corporations as 
fundamentally different from that of an individual, calling it a “creature of the state.”90 The case 
syllabus reads, “there is a clear distinction between an individual and a corporation, and the 
latter, being a creature of the State, has not the constitutional right to refuse to submit its books 
and papers for an examination at the suit of the State.”91 Importantly, however, the Court also 
found in this case that the Fourth Amendment protection against search and seizure was not 
“purely personal” and therefore was applicable to corporations.92 In arguing this point, Justice 
Brown seems to turn away from the argument that a corporation is nothing more than a state 
created entity he used to reject the self-incrimination argument, and instead chooses to focus on 
the individuals behind the corporation. Here he argues, “a corporation is, after all, but an 
association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing 
itself as a collective body, it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body.”93 
The corporation itself obviously had not change in terms of it actual makeup or status. The 
difference between these two decisions therefore must have been in the nature of each 
constitutional provision. And just as selective incorporation required a series of cases before a 
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clear approach for determining what rights are implicit in due process arose, so too did corporate 
constitutional rights require time before it became clear what made a particular provision of the 
Constitution “purely personal” and therefore not applicable to corporations.  
 In the next several decades, several more constitutional provisions were found to be 
applicable to corporations, and the judicial understanding of corporate personhood evolved as 
well. In 1909, for example, the Court found that corporations (not the people who own or 
manage them) could be found guilty of crimes.94 Russian Fleet v. U.S. reaffirmed corporate 
protection under the Takings clause,95 while G.M. Leasing Co v. U.S. also reaffirmed corporate 
protection under the Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure clause.96 In U.S. v. Martin Linen 
and Supply Co., the Court found corporations, like individuals, were protected against double 
jeopardy.97 This case is of interest because unlike the Takings clause, the nature of the provision 
at hand (dealing with the court process) is not obviously applicable to the everyday dealings of a 
business. However, similarly to the Search and Seizure clause, the purpose of the provision can 
be used to argue in favor of protecting a corporation. Because the purpose of both of these 
provisions, outside of just protecting individuals, is to ensure a fair and just judicial system, 
applying these protections to corporations can be reasonably seen as upholding this purpose. 
These decisions, taken together, also seemed to foretell of a Court more inclined to find in favor 
of corporate constitutional rights.  
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 Occurring amid these decisions is an interesting case worth addressing before moving on 
to more modern decisions. In Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Supermarket, the Court sought to 
answer whether a law requiring stores to close on Sundays violated equal protection and free 
exercise rights.98 Although the Court ultimately found the laws were not a violation of free 
exercise rights, the case is of interest here because the Court failed to address in its arguments 
whether a corporation even had free exercise rights that could be violated (or, in the words of 
Justice Brown, whether such a right was “purely personal”).99 Although such silence could not 
be taken definitively, it does indicate how apparently unremarkable the Court found it that a 
business should be seeking constitutional protection in this area.  
Seventeen years later, in one of the most important cases in corporate constitutional 
jurisprudence, the Court addressed this unanswered question. In First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti the Court found that corporations do have freedom of speech, protected by the First 
Amendment.100 At issue in this case was a Massachusetts law prohibiting corporations from 
making contributions or spending money to influence voting other than when the item to be 
voted on directly impacted the corporation.101 The majority, focusing on a reading of the First 
Amendment as a vehicle for encouraging public debate, and not just as a safeguard for individual 
expression, found that the law in question was unconstitutional.102 The Court focused on 
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“whether the law abridges expression that the First Amendment meant to protect,” arguing that 
“the inherent worth of speech… does not depend upon the identity of its source.”103 The majority 
rejected the argument, utilized by the lower court, that corporate First Amendment rights must be 
based on property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.104 But the Court also stated that there 
was no need to “… address the abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of 
rights that individuals enjoy under the First Amendment.”105 The Court here seems to indicate 
that corporations do not have rights fully equivalent to individuals under the First Amendment, 
and that their decision should not be interpreted as such. The question as to which rights were 
available to corporations and which are not had thus arisen again. This time, however, Justice 
Powell, writing for the majority, attempted to clarify the position:  
Certain "purely personal" guarantees, such as the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the 
"historic function" of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of 
individuals. United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 322 U. S. 698-701 (1944). Whether or 
not a particular guarantee is "purely personal" or is unavailable to corporations for some 
other reason depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional 
provision.106 [Emphasis added] 
 
The Court had thus finally clarified what factors it took into consideration when 
determining whether a corporation had the right to claim protection under a particular provision 
of the Bill of Rights. There is much to say about the similarity of this analysis compared to that 
utilized by the Court in determining whether a right was implicit in due process and therefore 
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applicable to the states (the approach utilized in selective incorporation), but that will be 
addressed in the following section. It is sufficient at this point to understand what this approach 
meant in the context of corporate constitutional rights: there was no blanket statement to be made 
about which rights were applicable to corporations and which were not. The Court would have to 
decide on a case-by-case basis.  
It is also important to note that Bellotti was a contested case, decided on a narrow five-to-
four margin. The dissenting opinions focused much more attention on the status of the appellee 
as a corporation, not an individual, seeking to define the difference. Justice White emphasized 
the importance of the state’s ability to balance corporations disproportionate economic power 
(which in turn could lead to a disproportionate power in the realm of political speech), as well as 
the fact that corporate funds, provided by individual shareholders, could be used against the 
interest of those individuals.107 Justice Rehnquist, adhering to a more traditional view of 
corporations, asserted in his dissent that as artificial entities, corporations should not be granted 
the same rights as natural persons.108 Gone, apparently, were the days of clear cut corporate 
rights; the Court had entered into more controversial territory.  
The issue of corporate freedom of speech was far from settled, however. In 1990, with 
many of the justices who voted in the majority in Bellotti having left the Court, a new case ruled, 
six-to-three, that the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, which prohibited corporations (with the 
exception of media corporations) “from using general treasury funds for, inter alia, independent 
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expenditures in connection with state candidate elections” was constitutionally valid.109 This 
suggested a reversal in opinion; now, it seemed, it was constitutional to limit free speech rights 
on the basis of corporate identity.  
Yet twenty years later, once again with major changes to the makeup of the Court, Austin 
(along with portions of McConnell v. FEC, another case in favor of limiting speech based on 
corporate identity) was overturned.110 In a highly contentious case, Citizens United v. Federal 
Elections Commission, the Court returned to the ideas set forth in the majority opinion in 
Bellotti, namely that the identity or status of the speaker does not make certain types of speech, 
particularly political speech, any less valuable, and therefore any less protected.111 Justice 
Stevens’ dissent mirrored that of Justice Rehnquist some thirty years prior, arguing that 
corporations were not members of society, and their status as corporations raise “legitimate 
concerns about their role in the electoral process.”112 The split between the justices was not just a 
matter of their conception of corporate personhood, however. It also hinged, as set forth in 
Bellotti, on different understandings of the purpose and history of the First Amendment and its 
protections. Considering the divide on the Court, and significant public disapproval of the 
decision, it is fair to say that the issue is far from settled.  
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An even more recent yet equally (if not more) controversial case regarding corporate 
constitutional rights is Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores.113 In this case, the Court moved away 
from issues of freedom of speech, and instead to what some would argue is an even more 
personal right – freedom of religion. Although the many details of this case, whose majority 
opinion is close to one hundred pages long, are important, for the purposes of this work the 
significant outcome was an apparent ruling in favor of corporate rights under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).114 Although the Court was quick to emphasize that 
corporations at hand in this case were “closely-held” (meaning they have a limited number of 
shareholders and while they do publicly trade their stocks it is not done on a regular basis), the 
decision still suggested that a publicly traded, for-profit corporation could be imbued with the 
religious beliefs of its owners, and that those beliefs are protected under the RFRA.115 Although 
not dealing directly with a constitutional provision, but rather an act of Congress, the case none-
the-less can be read as a favoring of corporate religious rights which could pave the way for 
finding corporations can be protected by the First Amendment’s freedom of religion.  
Among many other arguments, the dissenting opinion in this case, written by Justice 
Ginsburg, argued that for-profit corporations, by their very nature, could not be considered 
religious entities, and therefore were not protected under the RFRA or the Constitution.116 Once 
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again, the argument centered around differing views of corporate personality as well as the 
nature, history, and purpose of religious freedom and the RFRA.   
Unlike selective incorporation, now mostly a settled doctrine, corporate constitutional 
rights stand today as one of the most controversial areas of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The 
close margin on which the two most recent decisions were decided, the active distain for them 
from political figures and private individuals alike, as well as the seat recently left open by 
Justice Scalia’s death, make the issue of Supreme Court jurisprudence of corporate constitutional 
rights ripe for investigation. Before turning to the Court’s reasoning and intent, I turn now to a 
brief discussion focusing more on those arguments the Court has set forth against corporate 
constitutional rights in order to establish a firmer understanding of the approach being utilized.  
 
Arguments against Corporate Constitutional Rights 
 
 While the previous section focused more on those cases and arguments favoring 
constitutional rights, this section will seek to balance that. It is important to remember that while 
selective incorporation has left very few protections of the Bill of Rights unincorporated, the 
process of granting constitutional rights to corporations has progressed more slowly. Therefore, 
rather than addressing every provision of the Bill or Rights that has not yet been found to apply 
to corporations, as was done with selective incorporation, this section will focus on those 
arguments put forth against corporate constitutional rights by Supreme Court justices, whether 
they be in majority or dissenting opinions. This will help to establish a better understanding of 
the approach the Court is using and how.  
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Importantly, just as selective incorporation via the due process clause left open the option 
of finding certain rights not to be implicit in due process and therefore not applicable to the 
states, the use of the “purely personal” doctrine gave the Court leeway not only to find 
constitutional provisions to be outside of the reach of corporations, it also gives the Court the 
opportunity to reasonably change its mind as to the status of a particular right. Although not as 
common as with selective incorporation cases, this approach, which requires a great deal of 
semi-subjective interpretation as to the history, nature, and purpose of particular provisions of 
the Bill of Rights, leaves open the possibility of overturning previous cases as the makeup and 
ideology of the Court changes. Should the Court swing in favor of corporate constitutional rights, 
it is relatively easy to overturn a case by arguing that the previous opinion incorrectly interpreted 
the provision as “purely personal” and setting forth an alternative interpretation (or vice versa). 
The case law history of corporate freedom of expression rights is a good example of those 
changing ideologies affecting case decisions. Thus, the approach utilized by the Court in arguing 
against corporate constitutional rights is just as important as the approach used in granting them. 
It is therefore worth taking the time to establish that the judicial approach being utilized is 
consistent regardless of the position a particular justice is taking.  
 As mentioned above, the decision in Hale v. Henkel explicitly rejected the assertion that 
corporations (or individuals acting as agents of corporations) are protected under the Fifth 
Amendment protection against self-incrimination.117 Although the Court had yet to clearly lay 
out what factors it considers in finding a protection to be applicable to corporations, Justice 
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Brown’s decision in this case laid the groundwork for an approach based on an understanding of 
some rights being “purely personal” and therefore not applicable to corporations.118 Unlike rights 
relating to contracts, for example, this right was not one which was reasonably within the natural 
realm of business for a corporation. Like the more contentious issues surrounding freedom of 
expression and freedom of religion, this case required the Court to ask itself two questions: one, 
whether a corporation, as an entity separate from the individuals that make it up, can assert the 
right for its own sake or, two, whether a corporation, as an entity run by and composed of 
individuals, is imbued with the rights afforded to those individuals (essentially, do those rights 
“pass through” to the corporation). Although not clearly articulated yet, this approach matches 
the test laid out by Justice Powell in Bellotti, which relies on the nature, history, and purpose of a 
particular constitutional provision.119 The nature and purpose of the Fifth Amendment protection 
against self-incrimination, according to the Court, was to protect individuals from being forced 
to incriminate themselves, not to protect agents from incriminating the corporations for which 
they work. This understanding of what qualifies as a “purely personal” right was then expanded 
upon by Justice Powell in Bellotti, in which the Court laid out a set of characteristics it would 
look to in determining whether a right is inapplicable to corporations.120  
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The dissenting opinions in Bellotti,121 and later in Citizens United,122 are also important 
examples of how the Court has argued against corporate constitutional rights. Notably, even 
when arguing against corporate constitutional rights, these justices have not rejected the 
approach utilized by the majority; although the may not state it explicitly, these dissents utilize 
the same approach just with different results. The consistency of this reasoning, and a lack of 
argument against its basic precepts indicates the Court has settled the issue of how to determine 
whether a right is applicable to corporations; they just don’t always agree on the proper results.  
As with selective incorporation, in which some justices, mostly early on, outright rejected 
the concept that the Bill of Rights should be applicable to the states, Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinions in Bellotti and Citizens United, respectively, reject the 
notion that corporations should be afforded any constitutional protection outside of those 
provisions directly related to business transactions.123 Upon closer inspection, however, these 
justices are essentially carrying out a similar test as laid out by Justice Powell; they’re just 
coming to a different conclusion about whether the nature, history, and purpose of the provision 
is such that it should remain “purely personal.”  
Both Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens’ dissents rely heavily on a reading of 
corporations as primarily artificial entities with no claim to rights equivalent to natural 
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persons.124 In making this assertion, Rehnquist cites Chief Justice John Marshall, who stated, “a 
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of 
law.”125 Rehnquist went on to argue that “since it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a 
corporation does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons…our inquiry must 
seek to determine which constitutional protections are "incidental to its very existence.”126 
Having established this baseline, he then argued that the right of political expression is not 
necessary for the continued functioning of a corporation.127 At first glance, this might seem like a 
different approach than the “purely personal” one laid forth by the majority. But Rehnquist does 
not actually set forth any argument against the idea of finding some rights to be “purely 
personal”. In seeking to establish whether a constitutional protection is “incidental to its [a 
corporation’s] very existence,”128 Rehnquist is actually engaging in the same investigation 
Justice Powell does in the majority: does the constitutional provision have a history, nature, and 
purpose relevant to corporate rights. Rehnquist only goes a step further in clarifying that, in his 
opinion, only those provisions whose history, nature, and purpose are necessary to the 
corporation’s existence should be applied. But either way, the same essential analysis is taking 
place, and the approach is consistent.  
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A similar thing can be said for Justice Stevens’ dissent in Citizens United, which draws 
from a similar understanding of corporate personhood as Justice Rehnquist’s’ opinion in Bellotti. 
Stevens emphasizes that “in the context of election to public office, the distinction between 
corporate and human speakers is significant”129 and that corporations are not actually members 
of society the way natural persons are.130 The distinction between corporations and natural 
persons include such things as “financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental 
orientation,”131 and it is these differences that are cause for legitimate concern. Justice Stevens 
dissent rests primarily on the assertion that even if corporations have a measure of freedom of 
speech, it is not equivalent to that of natural persons and the state has a compelling interest in 
regulating it.132 While Stevens does not explicitly refer to the idea of “purely personal” rights, his 
dialogue of natural persons and corporations as being fundamentally different is an equivalent 
understanding. His argument fundamentally rests on interpretations of the nature, purpose, and 
history of freedom of speech, which he sees as primarily for retaining individual freedoms, while 
the majority focused instead on an interpretation that emphasized freedom of speech as a 
collective good, with the more contribution the better. But in each case, the justices utilized the 
same approach.  
Although there are certainly other factors, such as compelling state interest regarding a 
particular regulation, that the Court takes into consideration, these are secondary calculations. 
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The justices must first determine whether the corporation should be afforded a right, and that 
determination consistently rests on an examination of the provision at hand via a the test laid out 
in Bellotti.133 Therefore, this “purely personal” approach is consistently utilized across both the 
history of corporate constitutional case law, as well as across ideologies and opinions about the 
proper status of corporate constitutional protections. Having thus established the existence of a 
consistent, if not always explicit, approach, I will now turn to a brief discussion on the Court’s 
reasoning and intent behind this approach.  
 
Court Reasoning and Intent 
 
  Unlike selective incorporation, there were no definitive alternatives laid out for the 
“purely personal” approach utilized by the Court; no Supreme Court opinion, majority or 
otherwise, has ever suggested the possibility of applying every provision of the Bill of Rights to 
corporations all at once the way total incorporation via the Privileges and Immunities clause was 
advocated. The Court has been very careful to ensure that even decisions in favor of expanding a 
protection to cover corporations are narrowed to particular provisions and could not be 
misconstrued as granting broader protections.134 Although it may seem obvious why the Court 
chose not to sweepingly grant corporations protection under the Bill of Rights, for the purposes 
of greater clarity in comparison, I will undertake to lay out the reasoning behind this approach.  
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 First, as with selective incorporation to the states, a case-by-case approach to corporate 
constitutional rights gave the court considerably more freedom, because it allowed for finding 
certain provisions not to be applicable to corporations, without requiring the Court to lay out 
what provisions those were right away. As a result, they were also better able to control the 
breadth of their decisions (as in the area of freedom of expression, in which nuances such as the 
type of speech are relevant). This approach also afforded the Court significantly more freedom to 
change its position overtime as opinions changed, as discussed above with freedom of 
expression.135 With a flexible and fairly subjective test, should the Court choose to overturn a 
previous decision regarding corporate rights, the argument need only be that the previous court 
had an invalid or outdated interpretation of the provision at hand.  
 Secondly, and also like selective incorporation, this case-by-case approach allowed the 
Court to steadily build a case history overtime, therefore creating lasting and significant 
precedent, making any efforts to dismiss the general right of corporations to at least some 
constitutional rights very difficult. Although corporate constitutional rights had a less contentious 
start than selective incorporation did, justices in favor of more expansive corporate rights would 
have favored this incremental approach because it would allow the court to address less 
controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights (such as the Takings clause)136 before moving to 
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more contentious ones (like freedom of religion);137 certain decisions could wait until the 
precedent was well established and a Court friendly to the idea came along. And, while perhaps 
not as necessary as with selective incorporation, this approach allowed both justices and the 
public to become more and more comfortable with the general idea overtime before delving into 
more controversial issues.  
Justices fearing expansion of corporate rights beyond a certain point would also be in 
favor of this approach, because it gave clarity as to why some provisions are applicable to 
corporation and not others; they could argue the vast majority of rights are actually “purely 
personal” while still protecting businesses against government seizure, for example.138 Again, the 
fact that the approach requires a clause-by-clause investigation of each protection in the Bill of 
Rights before finding it to be applicable to corporations would not only have allowed these 
justices to avoid making clear distinctions about what rights corporations do or do not have right 
at the time, it also would have assuaged fear that proponents of corporate rights would be able to 
make sweeping guarantees. No matter what side a justice took in the overall debate about 
corporate personhood, they had reason to support this approach.  
Thus, the Court settled on an incremental approach, requiring an investigation of the 
nature, history, and purpose of each provision of the Constitution to determine whether it was 
applicable to corporations, or if it was “purely personal” and therefore inaccessible by business 
entities. Although the case history of corporate constitutional rights, particularly in recent years, 
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is messy and at times confusing, the use of this approach is consistent across both time and 
ideology. Having thus established the approach at work, and explained its appeal to the Court, I 
will now turn to an analysis and comparison of the two approaches to determine the extent to 
which one is analogous to the other. 
  58 
COMPARISON AND EVALUATION  
 
Having now established a clearer understanding of both the doctrine of selective 
incorporation and the approach utilized by the Court in corporate constitutional cases, this work 
will now compare the two doctrines to gain a better understanding of the corporate constitutional 
rights approach, which for several reasons has not yet been well established. In doing so, I will 
demonstrate the immense similarities between the two jurisprudential approaches in three 
fundamental areas: their process, the Court’s intent, and their overall effect. Finding selective 
incorporation to be an analogous doctrine for corporation incorporation is significant because it 
will allow for not only a better understanding of previous Court decisions it this area, but more 
importantly because it can greatly aid the process of making predictions and provide a new frame 
of reference for interpreting future decisions.  
 First, and perhaps most notably, both of these jurisprudential approaches require the same 
“test”, meaning they require the Court to investigate the same things or to ask the same 
questions. In the area of corporate constitutional rights, Justice Powell clearly laid out this test in 
Bellotti, as discussed in the previous section. It is worth reiterating this here. Having stated that 
certain rights are not applicable to corporations because they are “purely personal,” Powell was 
then faced with the question of what rights fell into this category. He answered: “whether or not 
a particular guarantee is "purely personal" or is unavailable to corporations for some other reason 
depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.”139  
                                                 
139 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 US 765 (1978). Footnote 14.  
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Once the Supreme Court had decided on the use of the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as the textual basis for selective incorporation,140 the Court was faced 
with a similar question as Powell; under what basis would the Court determine what rights were 
implicit in the Due Process clause and which were not? In deciding whether a provision of the 
Bill of Rights was a fundamental right, necessary to maintain due process the Court turned to the 
exact same questions as they have in corporate incorporation: what is the nature, history, and 
purpose of the provision in question.141 Although the Court’s focus in conducting such an inquiry 
naturally differs depending upon whether the case deals with selective incorporation or corporate 
constitutional rights, the essential process of the two approaches, which both require an 
interpretation of the pertinent nature, history, and purpose of individual rights and protections, is 
the same.   
 There are also considerable similarities in the Court’s reasoning behind adopting each 
approach, suggesting the Court had similar intents behind both. Although this work does not 
purport to know exactly why any individual justice favored these incremental approaches over 
another, there are obvious benefits to these approaches which the justices likely took into 
consideration. Because the two approaches are so similar, their benefits are essentially identical. 
For example, because both approaches required the Court to make decisions on a case-by-case 
basis, interpreting individual provisions at a time, both allowed to the Court to decide cases on 
fairly narrow grounds (incorporating or applying a single provision) while deferring decisions on 
                                                 
140 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, (1884); and, later, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
141 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
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other provisions. The Court could wait until an applicable case arose to perform the necessary 
analysis of that provision. This relatively slow progression of case history was also important in 
building up precedent sufficient to firmly ground each doctrine and to help prevent a future court 
from overturning the entire doctrine. Although perhaps more relevant to selective incorporation 
than corporate rights, these gradual approaches also allowed the public (and justices) to adjust to 
new a new understanding of the role of the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, they provided firm 
precedent for the Court to rely on when deciding more controversial cases (such rights of the 
accused under selective incorporation142 or freedom of speech under corporate rights143). Yet, 
while these large number of cases helped establish a secure precedent, it also gave the Court a 
greater opportunity to overturning single decisions in the future as overall opinions (and the 
makeup of the Court) changed. This allowed the Court to maintain the original approach and still 
disagree with a case outcome; all a new majority would need to do was argue convincingly that 
the previous Court’s interpretation of that particular provision was invalid (something fairly easy 
to do considering the subjective nature of this interpretation). It is also important to remember 
that the incremental nature of these approaches was appealing to both those in favor of 
expanding rights as well as those seeking to maintain more limited interpretations. The reasons 
above clearly demonstrate why many justices in favor of incorporation to the states or corporate 
constitutional rights would consider the approach a wise one, but those justices wary of either of 
these two jurisprudential patterns could find comfort that an incremental approach would provide 
                                                 
142 Various Warren Court decisions including Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) and Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
143 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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a lot of opportunities to argue against expansion of rights, as well as ensure that the process 
would not be quick and comprehensive.  
 Finally, the effect of each approach has so far been very similar. Most notable is of 
course the fact that both approaches required the Court to take a slow, incremental approach, 
interpreting single provisions of the Bill of Rights on a case-by-case basis. This explains the 
decades long history of both selective incorporation and corporate constitutional rights, including 
several instances of decisions being overruled or modified. Changes overtime (and depending on 
the makeup of the Court) are common within both timelines. It is interesting to note, for 
example, that it took several decades and a very friendly court for many of the criminal 
protections of the Bill of Rights (which were more controversial than many previous decisions) 
to be applied to the states.144 The applicability of this situation to the future of corporate 
constitutional rights will be addressed in the next section. For now, it is sufficient to point out 
that the timelines of both doctrines follow a similar pattern; less controversial rights were applied 
first (such as freedom of expression for selective incorporation and property rights for 
corporation) while more contentious issues (such as rights of the accused or freedom of speech) 
were addressed later, once the doctrine was well established. 
 It is important to acknowledge, of course, that while there are obviously many similarities 
between the two approaches, there are important differences as well. For one, some may argue 
that total incorporation of the Bill of Rights had a firmer textual basis and greater viability than 
                                                 
144 Various Warren Court decisions including Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) and Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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any similar attempt at applying every provision of the Bill of Rights to corporations. It would be 
much more difficult to argue, if anyone even would, that every provision of the Bill of Rights 
should be applied to corporations. Another, related, difference has been the speed with which 
each line of cases has progressed. As the previous sections established, the case history of 
selective incorporation and corporate rights have similar starting points and significant overlap 
early on. Yet in the contemporary era, far more provisions of the Bill of Rights have been 
applied to the states than to corporations. Is there a fundamental difference between these two 
approaches, and more importantly, does it affect the ability to make predictions about the future 
of one using the other? I would argue no. While the purpose of the two doctrines is inarguably 
different (because the difference between ensuring the Bill of Rights protects individuals from 
state encroachment and ensuring the Bill of Rights protects non-human entities like corporations 
is inarguable), this does not detract from the numerous critical similarities of these approaches 
that makes selective incorporation such an appropriate and innovative analogy for corporate 
constitutional rights jurisprudence. After all, that a stronger argument may have been made for 
total incorporation did not help it to be any more successful as a judicial strategy than full 
applicability of the Bill of Rights to corporations. Nor does it really say much that the Court has 
progressed further in applying protections to the states than to corporations. Periodic breaks in 
the selective incorporation timeline of cases were not an indication that the Court had 
incorporated every provision they had intended to, or that there wouldn’t be future Courts that 
would seek out and decided many cases on the issue within a small period. The same can be said 
of corporate constitutional rights.  
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 Thus, it should now be clear that the doctrine of selective incorporation is an exemplary 
analogy for the jurisprudential approach utilized by the Court in applying constitutional 
provisions to corporations, with critical similarities in process, intent, and effect. This offers a 
unique opportunity to look towards the future of corporate constitutional rights and make 
predictions based on this new understanding of the Court’s approach, which this work will now 
endeavor towards. 
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PREDICTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Having established the use of the selective incorporation doctrine as an appropriate 
analogy for the approach the Court has utilized in deciding corporate constitutional rights, this 
work will now put this analysis to work, and in doing so seek to make predictions about the 
future of corporate constitutional rights. Before delving into these predictions, however, it is 
important to note that the current state of the Supreme Court makes this a particularly difficult, 
but also significant, time to be making predictions about future Court jurisprudence.  
With the death of Justice Scalia in February 2016, at the time of this writing, there 
remains a vacant seat on the Court. Judge Neil Gorsuch, previously of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, has been announced as President Trump’s nominee. His 
confirmation hearing is currently set for March 20, 2017.145 As with any new appointee, there 
has been much speculation about where Gorsuch will stand on a variety of issues, including 
corporate constitutional rights. Although there have certainly been instances in the past of 
justices making surprising reversals once appointed to the Court, it is nevertheless useful to 
discern Gorsuch’s current position regarding corporate constitutional rights. Keeping in mind 
that several of the recent corporate rights cases have been decided on narrow five-to-four 
margins, and that Justice Scalia consistently voted in favor of those rights, Gorsuch’s position is 
crucial in evaluating the future of jurisprudence in this area.  
                                                 
145 Seung Min Kim, "Gorsuch confirmation hearing set for March 20," Politico, February 16, 2017, accessed 
March 14, 2017, http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/gorsuch-confirmation-hearing-set-for-march-20-
235084. 
  65 
 Without the benefit of the confirmation hearing, in which the Senate Judiciary 
Committee may very well explicitly ask Gorsuch’s views on corporate rights, the next best thing 
is to turn to his case history while on the Tenth Circuit. This case history points to a consistently 
conservative viewpoint, similar to the late Justice Scalia’s in many ways. Notably, it also 
indicates a favoring of corporate constitutional rights. Gorsuch’s positions in two major cases, 
both of which continued to the Supreme Court, are good examples. In both Hobby Lobby and 
Little Sisters of the Poor, Gorsuch voted in favor of granting religious freedom rights to 
corporations; in the case of Little Sisters of the Poor, that corporation was a non-profit, while in 
the case of Hobby Lobby, the claimant was a closely-held for-profit corporation.146 Although 
Gorsuch did not write the majority opinion in either of these cases, which limits the extent to 
which we can garner his exact views, it is clear that he did not take issue with the corporate 
status of the appellants in either case, indicating a position in favor of corporate constitutional 
rights. Although less directly related, Gorsuch also has a history of ruling against administrative 
agencies, whose regulations often limit the capabilities of corporations.147 While certainly not 
decisive evidence, it does suggest, especially when coupled with his rulings in Hobby Lobby and 
Little Sisters of the Poor, a pattern of favoring corporate rights. It seems imminently reasonable, 
considering the evidence currently available, to assume Gorsuch will fill Justice Scalia’s role as a 
consistent vote in favor of corporate constitutional rights.   
                                                 
146 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013); Little Sisters of the Poor Home for 
the Aged, Denver, Colo. v. Burwell, 799 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2015). 
147 See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1143 (10th Cir. 2016) and Caring Hearts Personal Home 
Services., Inc. v. Burwell, 824 F.3d 968 (10th Cir. 2016). 
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Keeping this in mind, let us now investigate what the history of selective incorporation 
can tell us about the future of corporate constitutional rights. For one, the timeline of selective 
incorporation suggests that long gaps in cases do not indicate an end to further application.148 
Therefore, should this Court decide to refuse cases positing expansion of corporate constitutional 
rights, that is not sufficient reason to think that a future Court will not take up the issue with 
force. In fact, the history of selective incorporation provides significant evidence that with this 
style of approach, favorable Courts may seek to take advantage of their position and make many 
consecutive decisions while they can, leaving sporadic upticks in cases amongst otherwise long 
gaps. The Warren Court is a prime example of this occurrence within selective incorporation, 
where the liberal majority incorporated many provisions of the Bill of Rights, including the 
significantly more controversial rights of the accused and criminal defendants.149 With the Court 
likely to retain its five-justice majority favoring corporate constitutional rights, and considering 
the cases that have already been decided by the Roberts Court, there is sufficient reason to 
believe that we are entering a similar situation with corporate constitutional rights. With a 
sufficient precedent established and a favorable court, the time is ripe for using the incremental 
approach to apply many more rights and protections to corporations. Therefore, if the analogy 
                                                 
148 Consider, for example, the distance between McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) and the 
closest previous case (perhaps as far back as Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)). 
149 Warren Court incorporation cases include: Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (right against unreasonable 
search and seizure, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (protection against cruel and unusual 
punishments, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in felony cases), and Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination).  
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stands, it is reasonable to argue that, just as selective incorporation gradually built upon itself, we 
can expect several more decisions applying constitutional rights and protections, building upon 
themselves, and we can expect them in the relatively near future. Although somewhat outside the 
scope of this thesis, it is also interesting to note that within both timelines, although it is common 
to reverse previous cases to find in favor of expanding rights, it is very rare for the Court to “take 
back” a right once it has been applied (either to the states or to corporations). To the extent that 
this pattern continues in corporate constitutional jurisprudence especially, it provides further 
support for the argument that the Court will continue to expand corporate constitutional rights. 
The question then becomes what rights are most likely to be applied next.  
Retaining the use of selective incorporation as an analogy for the Court’s approach to 
corporate constitutional rights suggests a tendency to decide less controversial cases first in order 
to build precedent. In selective incorporation, this was a series of cases incorporating freedom of 
expression, which most states already protected to a certain degree, and which the public was 
largely in favor of. For corporate constitutional rights, this was a series of cases protecting 
corporate contracts and property, which had obvious connections to the functionality and success 
of a business. Once a friendly Court began deciding more controversial cases relating to rights of 
the accused on criminal defendants, many similar cases followed. Therefore, reasoning by 
analogy once again, it is logical to suggest that since the current Court has indicated an interest in 
expanding corporate freedom of expression rights, the trend will continue. Continued and more 
expansive rulings giving for-profit corporations freedom of religion, for example, is likely. This 
is especially so when one considers how this issue of religious freedom has recently become 
intimately intertwined with the ability of business owners or employees to refuse service to 
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LGBT persons on religious grounds. Should a case come before the Supreme Court asking it to 
rule on whether a corporation has religious freedom and whether it can be used to refuse service, 
there is significant reason to believe they will answer in the affirmative. Further opportunities to 
affirm Citizens United and the position that corporations should enjoy freedom of (political) 
speech are also likely to be taken up by the Court. This includes further limiting of regulations on 
corporate spending in the political arena.  
As for other constitutional provisions, the future remains more uncertain, and the analogy 
of selective incorporation may prove less useful. The Court, for example, has already found that 
corporations can be found guilty of crimes,150 and that certain procedural rights such as due 
process and double jeopardy are applicable.151 In the wake of recent decisions regarding 
corporate speech, it would be interesting to see the Court revisit its previous decisions which 
refused to apply the right of self-incrimination to corporations.152 Would today’s Court, which 
has thus far clearly favored a reading of corporations as more than just state-created, artificial 
entities, reconsider the finding that such a right is “purely personal”? In the wake of several 
decades of massive class-action lawsuits with punitive damages in the millions of even billions 
of dollars, might the current (or a future) Court find that corporations should be protected against 
excessive fines? With little precedent to go on, it is difficult to say. Still, it is important to 
remember that there was a time in the history of selective incorporation when justices and the 
                                                 
150 New York Central R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
151 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 395 (1886); United States v. Martin Linen Supply 
Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977). 
152 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, (1906). 
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public alike were certain that the selective approach that had been chosen would ensure only a 
limited number of fundamental rights would be incorporated. Considering the striking 
similarities this work has established between the selective incorporation doctrine and the 
approach of the Court to applying constitutional rights to corporations, we must ask ourselves to 
what extent we are just as naïve in assuming certain rights will remain “purely personal” and 
therefore inapplicable to corporations.  
With recent Court decisions putting corporate constitutional rights at the forefront of 
many public issues, including placing them at odds with other important rights, there has been a 
significant increase in the interest in the topic. This inevitably has led to an outpouring of 
opinions about not only what is the correct path for the future of our nation, but also what the 
most likely path is. Without a firm understanding of the Court’s case history, especially any 
established patterns in reasoning across those cases, these predictions all miss a fundamental 
piece of information. This work has sought to provide a new basis for understanding Supreme 
Court jurisprudence in the area of corporate constitutional rights. By comparing the approach the 
Court has used to apply provisions of the Bill of Rights to corporations with the well-known 
approach of selective incorporation, which applied provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states, 
this helps to establish a unique framework for understanding the Court’s decisions in past 
corporate rights cases. More importantly, though, it allows for a new tool in predicting the future 
of corporate constitutional rights. 
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